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THE SHIFTING TERRAIN OF RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY ON THE LIABILITY
INSURANCE FIELD
Tom

Baker*

[A] high degree of scientific and technical uncertainty permeates
the insurance industry, the very business that is charged with trans
forming uncertainty into risk .... Scrutiny of how insurers face their
own incapacities reveals that theirs is an uncertain business, and
that we live not so much in a risk society as in an uncertain society.1

INTRODUCTION
Concepts can impede understanding, sometimes by persuading us
that we understand something that we really do not; other times they
impede understanding by diverting our attention from what we would
readily recognize that we do not understand, if only we thought long
enough about it. The conceptual link between insurance and risk
with risk understood here as the calculable subset within a larger set
of uncertainties-may be one such impediment.2 lf insurance and risk
are tightly linked, and if risk is ca/wlable, then we may think that we
can

understand

the

insurance

business

as

a

kind

of

applied

econometric enterprise.
Work in Jaw and political science has challenged the idea that insur
ance underwriting and pricing should be based on purely statistical
considerations.3 Yet even this work has tended to take as given the
links between insurance and risk and between risk and calculability.

Risk classification undoubtedly is " ( t ] oo ( i ] mportant to be [ ! ] eft to the
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[a]ctuaries,"4 but the substitutes offered are other concepts-equal
protection, privacy, and solidarity-that would trump the (imagined}
purely statistical analysis only in limited circumstances. Left uninves
tigated and therefore not understood by these challenges is the pro
cess through which insurance institutions actually transform (or do not
transform) uncertainty into risk.
Recent sociological and historical work-most prominently that of
Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, on the one hand, and Timothy Al
born on the other-has helped to remind us that insurance risks very
often are not reliably calculable except in hindsight, at which point the
risk has already been transformed into an all-too-measurable loss.5
Insurance is an "uncertain business," characterized by competition for
premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown.6 Even life insur
ance, the part of the business that manages the oldest and best-under
stood insurance risk-mortality-operates just beyond the limits of
knowledge.7 For a recent example, consider the life-settlements mar
ket through which hedge funds purchase and hold bundles of life in
surance in a strategy to exploit and systematically frustrate life
insurers' actuarial assumptions.8
This Article takes some preliminary steps in the direction of ex
tending the insights of this sociological and historical work to the lia
bility insurance field. Part II begins with a simple quantitative
comparison of U.S. property and liability insurance premiums over
the last sixty years, setting the stage to make four points.9 First, liabil
ity insurance premiums have grown about as much as property insur
ance premiums over this period, 10 providing yet another piece of
evidence supporting the view that the growth in U.S. liability costs
represents an ordinary consequence of a growing economy rather than
an unusual or pernicious feature of U.S. culture.11 Second, there are
systematic variations in the rate of growth in insurance premiums over
4. Leah Wortham,

Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries,

MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 ( 1986).
5.

See generally TIMOTHY

19 U.

ALBORN, REGULATED LivEs: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH Soci

ETY, 1800-1914 (2009): ERICSON & DoYLE,

supra note

1.

See also

GEoFFREY CLARK, BETTING

ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 (1999); PAT O'MALLEY,

RI SK, UNCERTAINTY AND GoVERNMENT (2004).
6.
7.
8.

See ERICSON & DoYLE, supra note 1, at 47.
See hi.; see also ALBORN, supra note 5, at lJ-11, 102-35.
See Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 6,

2009, at At.

See infra notes 15-22.
See infra notes 17-19.
11. See generally WILl.IAM
9.

10.

HALTOM & MICHAEL McCANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: PoLITICS,

MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
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time corresponding to what is known in the insurance industry as the
underwriting cycle.12 The cycle is more pronounced in liability insur
ance than in property insurance, perhaps accounting for the greater
popular attention to the uncertainties of liability risks as compared to
property risks. Third, the greater variation in liability insurance pre
miums is almost entirely attributable to the smaller, non-statutorily
required lines of insurance: most significantly the various lines of com
mercial liability insurance. Auto liability and workers' compensation
premiums, by contrast, largely vary in tandem with property insurance
premiums. Finally, because media coverage of liability and liability in
surance increases during the insurance "crisis" stage of the underwrit
ing cycle-when premiums increase sharply-the widely held beliefs
in myths about litigation may result, at least in part, from generaliza
tions drawn from a systematically biased set of observations, analo
gous to the media bias toward big, unusual cases documented by
William Haltom and Michael McCann.13
Part III moves in a more qualitative, speculative direction by con
sidering liability insurance as a "business that is charged with trans
forming uncertainty into risk."14 It discusses how one might explore
more systematically in the liability and insurance context the signifi
cance of Ericson and Doyle's remarkable conclusion that uncertainty
reducing innovations shift the limits of insurers' knowledge but do not
shift insurers' need to operate just beyond those limits. It explores
some of the changing terrain of risk and uncertainty on the liability
insurance field, closing with the admittedly speculative conclusion that
the insurance underwriting cycle might be both a cause and a conse
quence of liability insurers' efforts to push the liability and insurability
frontier.
II.

COMPARING LIABILITY AND PROPERTY INSURANCE
PREMIUMS OVER TIME

In setting out to compile the aggregate data that would form the
empirical backdrop for this Article, I assumed two things that turned
out to be wrong. First, I assumed that compiling the data would be
easy, because the same statistical service (Best's) has continuously
tracked the property casualty insurance industry for over one hundred
12.

See

Sean M. Fitzpatrick,

Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10

13.

See

HALTOM & McCANN,

CoNN. INs. L.J. 255. 256 (2003).
14. ERicsoN &

supra note 11. at 156-59.
DoYLE. supra note l. at 5; see also infra notes

23-53.

T
524

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:521

years.t5 Second, and more interestingly, I assumed that liability insur
ance premiums would show much more significant growth than prop
erty premiums, particularly in the latter third of the twentieth century.
Like other empirically minded torts teachers, I have followed the
tort reform debates closely and, although I have disagreed with the
defendants' lobby about the interpretation of the data, 16 I knew that
aggregate liability insurance premiums in the U.S. had grown substan
tially in real terms over the twentieth century. I had always assumed
that this growth significantly outpaced growth in property insurance
premiums. Otherwise, why were insurance industry sources so out
spoken about rising liability insurance premiums? In most cases, the
same insurance groups write liability and property insurance, and I
assumed (wrongly, it turns out) that their comparative silence about
property insurance premiums meant that those premiums were not
increasing as much.
Below, Figure 1 shows that I was wrong about the relationship be
tween property and liability insurance while also showing that, despite
some difficulty, it is possible to compile the data.t7 Figure 1 plots the
aggregate liability and property insurance premiums from 1939 to
2008 in constant 2008 dollars for the total U.S. insurance industry, as
reported by Best's based on data from the annual reports required to
be filed with state insurance departments in the United States (and
converted to 2008 dollars using the consumer price index table from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics).18 The solid line represents total liabil
ity insurance premiums; the dashed line represents total property in
surance premiums; and the dotted line represents the difference
between the two.

15.

See Best's, Aggregates and Averages: Property Casualty Edition and predecessor

publications.

16. See, e.g., ToM B AKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); Tom Baker, Herbert

Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Jackpot Justice

Science

and the American Tort System: Thinking Beyond Junk
95, 2008), available at http://

( William Mitchell College of Law, Research Paper No.

ssm.com/abstract=1152306.

17.

The difficulty comes from the fact that the data categories have changed several times

during the

1939 to 2008 period, reflecting changes in the categories in which insurance regulators

have required insurance companies to report their premiums and in which Best's has aggregated
that data in its annual publication.

18. See

Best's,

supra note 15.

U.S. DEI''T oF LABoR: CoNsUMER PRICE INDEX, ftp://ftp.bls.

gov/pub/special.requestslcpilcpiai.txt (last visited Mar. 31,

2011)

(updated monthly). These ag

gregate premiums likely understate the growth in property and liability losses in the large com
mercial sector of the U.S. economy, as large corporations have increasingly retained the most
predictable and most costly primary layer of exposure, but I am aware of no reason that this
trend would have a differential effect on property and liability insurance premiums.

I
I
I

I
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NET PREMIUMS WRITIEN, u.s. P&C INDUSTRY

1939-2008
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From 1958-the year when total liability premiums first equaled total
property insurance premiums-to 2008, property insurance premiums
have grown at a real average annual rate of 3.21 o/o and liability insur
ance premiums have grown at a real annual average rate of 3.67o/o.
Over that period, property insurance premiums have grown a total of
368o/o and liability insurance premiums have grown a total of 436°/o in
constant 2008 dollars. Over that same period, GOP grew 414o/o in real
terms, indicating that the property insurance premium growth slightly
lagged that of the economy generally and liability insurance slightly
outpaced that growth, but the orders of magnitude are very similar.19
As the dotted line in Figure 1 reflects, liability insurance premiums
have grown at a more variable rate than property insurance premi
ums. From 1958 to 2008, aggregate liability insurance premiums aver
aged 124 o/o of aggregate property insurance premiums, but there was
an eleven-year period-from 1986 to 1997-in which the liability in
surance premiums were 145o/o of the property insurance premiums.20
The difference between the premiums in the two categories of insur
ance is greatest following the three most significant "hard market"
phases of the underwriting cycle that occurred during this period:
19.

Author's calculation uses the U.S. Dm•'T oF CoMMERCE BuREAU oF EcoN. ANALYSIS,

available at http://www.bea.gov/nationaVnipaweb/SclcctTable.asp?Popular= Y
1.1.6), and CoNsUMER PRICE INDEX, supra note 18. Liability insurance premium

GOP TABLES,
(use Table

growth substantially outpaced property insurance premium growth in the early years shown in
Figure

1.

From

1939 to 1958, property insurance premiums grew 151 o/o in real terms while liabil
265% in real terms.

ity insurance premiums grew

20.

All calculations are based on Best's data and Consumer Price Index data used as source

for Figure

1.
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1976-1977, 1985-1986, and 2002-2003.21 Much of the difference is at
tributable to rapid growth in liability insurance premiums during just
two years: 1985 and 1986 (a 56% increase in liability insurance premi
ums over those two years compared to 28o/o increase in property in
surance premiums). The rest is attributable to differences in growth
during 1975-1976 (34% for liability and 26o/o for property) and
2002-2003 (27o/o for liability and 20°/o for property), and to quicker
declines in growth in property insurance premiums following each of
the three hard market periods.
This difference in the variability of premium growth rates helps ex
plain the popular perception that liability insurance has grown more
rapidly than property insurance. During hard market periods, liability
insurance premiums in fact do grow more rapidly than property insur
ance premiums. These are also the periods in which articles about the
problems in liability appear most widely in the media.22 Thus, al
though liability and property insurance premiums may be growing at
roughly the same rate on average, liability insurance premiums grow
more rapidly when people are most likely to pay attention, leading to
the facially plausible, but in fact incorrect belief that liability insurance
premiums-and therefore the underlying liabilities-generally grow
at a rate significantly exceeding the growth in GDP. In other words,
the perception that liability and liability insurance premiums have
grown disproportionately in relation to the underlying economy rep
resents a generalization from a biased set of observations.
Below, Figure 2 presents a breakdown of the liability insurance pre
miums over time by category of insurance. Figure 2 reflects a reality
that is often forgotten: at the aggregate level, the liability insurance
market is dominated by the legally mandated forms of liability insur
ance-auto liability and workers' compensation. Automobile liability
insurance premiums account for more than half of the total in all but a
few years during this period. Only in very recent years have all of the
other kinds of liability insurance put together equaled the workers'
compensation share of liability insurance premiums. Moreover, the
slight decline in the share of workers' compensation insurance premi
ums reflects slower growth in workers' compensation insurance pre
miums rather than particularly rapid growth in the other non-auto
2 1.

See

Scott E. Harrington,

Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in

BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAI'ERS ON fiNANCIAL SERVICES 97, 97 ( Robert E. Litan & Richard

Herring eds., 2004).
22.

See Tom

Baker,

Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Undenvriting Cycle, 54

DEPAUL L.

REv. 393, 431-33 (2005) (reporting results of content analysis of news files relating to medical

malpractice).

Cf.

HALTOM & McCANN,

supra note

the media to perceptions about tort law).

11, at 147-82 (discussing the importance of
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lines of liability insurance. Despite all the attention to medical mal
practice and products liability in the media and the academic litera
ture, medical malpractice insurance premiums represent a tiny
fraction of the total; and the products liability insurance premium line
is barely visible at the bottom of the chart.
FIGURE 2
LIABILITY INSURANCE NET PREMIUMS WRITTEN,

2008
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Thinking about Figures 1 and 2 together raises a question about
what portions of the liability insurance market are driving the differ
ence in the variability of the liability and property premiums over
time. Figure 1 shows that liability insurance premiums are more varia
ble than property insurance premiums. Figure 2 suggests that the lines
of insurance that are not the legally mandated forms of liability insur
ance have grown more significantly than those traditional lines (auto
and workers' compensation), but Figure 2 does not allow for easy
comparisons in the rates of growth. Figure 3, below, does just that.
Figure 3 shows the annual real growth in property insurance premi
ums (the dotted line), the statutorily mandated liability insurance lines
of auto and workers' compensation (the dashed line), and all of the
other lines of liability insurance (the solid line). As Figure 3 shows,
the growth in automobile and workers' compensation lines has closely
tracked that of property insurance since the 1950s. The big difference
lies in the other lines of liability insurance, suggesting that there are
greater year-to-year uncertainties in those other lines of liability insur
ance than in either automobile liability or workers' compensation
insurance.
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III.

TRANSFORMING UNCERTAINTY INTO RISK?

Summarizing the discussion thus far, what we see is that aggregate
property and liability insurance premiums have grown at roughly
the same rate, on average, since the middle of the twentieth century,
but the growth in liability insurance premiums varies over time more
significantly than the growth in property insurance premiums. The
long term total growth in liability insurance premiums is largely attrib
utable to automobile liability insurance, with the premiums for all
non-auto liability insurance exceeding the premiums for workers'
compensation insurance only in the last ten years; this is apparently a
result of decline in the growth of workers' compensation insurance
rather than a significant increase in the growth of these other kinds of
insurance. Finally, developments in those other kinds of liability in
surance account for most of the greater variation in liability insurance
premiums as compared to property insurance.
If Ericson and Doyle's generalizations about risk and uncertainty
hold true in the liability insurance market, then these already variable
aggregate results should be masking even more turmoil in the opera
tion of the liability insurance business. There are good reasons to be
lieve that Ericson and Doyle's generalizations do hold true in this
context. Ericson and Doyle investigated three sectors of the insurance
industry: life insurance, disability insurance, and property insurance.23
Notwithstanding the significant differences among these sectors-difU.S.

23. See generally ERicsoN & DoYLE, supra

note 1.
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ferent kinds of insured risks and different approaches to managing
those risks-the researchers found a common pattern of competition
pushing organizations just beyond the limits of knowledge.24 To be
lieve that this pattern would not hold in the liability insurance context,
we would need to have some reason to conclude that liability insur
ance risks are more calculable than life, disability, or property insur
ance risks.
Yet there are good reasons to believe that liability insurance risks
may be less calculable than these other risks. The forms of insurance
that Ericson and Doyle investigated are loss-based, meaning that they
provide financial protection for the designated harm (death, disability,
or property damage) without regard to how the harm took place.
Pricing these kinds of insurance requires estimating the rate and cost
of the insured harms. By contrast, liability insurance provides finan
cial protection only when the harm can be attributed to a liability
creating act such as the breach of the standard of reasonable care or
in the workers' compensation context-an injury arising out of work.
This means that the uncertainties of liability insurance include not
only developments in the rate and cost of insured harms but also de
velopments in the standard of care and other aspects of liability.25
Uncertainties about these latter developments add an additional layer
of uncertainty to the uncertainties about the underlying injuries and
damage. The greater variation between property and liability insur
ance premiums at the aggregate level, as described in Part II, provides
some support for this conclusion.
Nevertheless, even if liability-related risks are only as uncertain as
those addressed by disability, life, and property insurance, that would
leave more than enough room for the dynamic that Ericson and Doyle
described: namely, that uncertainty-reducing innovations shift the lim
its of knowledge but not insurers' need to operate just beyond those
limits. In the remainder of this Part, I will offer some admittedly im
pressionistic suggestions of some of the ways that this dynamic plays
out in the liability insurance context.
A.

Transforming Uncertainty into Risk

Based on observation and study of the liability insurance market,
my sense is that three key developments have improved liability insur
ers' ability to predict liability risks. This sense represents informed
24. See id. at 22-23.
25. See Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERs <>N RtsK AND INs. 12H,
130-31 (2004).
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intuition, without systematic empirical support. Thus, the following
should be regarded as hypotheses, not proof: {1) advances in data
gathering and analysis have led to a quantitative revolution in the
tracking and valuation of routine claims, especially in the automobile
liability context, resulting in more accurate forecasts of both the fre
quency and severity of insured liability losses; (2) because the liability
insurance policy limits purchased by individuals have not kept pace
with inflation, once again especially for automobile liability, an in
creasing percentage of claims are capped at the policy limit, in effect
truncating the right tail of the severity distribution (i.e., the high se
verity claims that happen less frequently); and (3) insurers have
shifted an increasing proportion of their professional and commercial
liability risks into a kind of insurance contract that poses less of the
difficult-to-evaluate "long tail" liability risk than the contracts of the
past. The paragraphs that follow describe each of these hypotheses in
turn.
1.

The Quant Revolution

Although still very much a work in progress, the quant revolution
has significantly changed the valuation of routine accident claims, es
pecially in the automobile liability context. The automobile insurance
adjusters from the 1960s, as profiled in H. Lawrence Ross's Settled
Out of Court, used their intuition and experience to craft settlement
offers.26 Today, automobile insurance adjusters use claims-valuation
software that takes the injury and demographic information and pro
duces a range of permissible settlement offers. To my knowledge,
there are no publications reporting the results of horse races between
the quantitative models and experienced adjusters, but my informed
impression is that the automobile insurance industry has completely
shifted to data-driven adjusting for routine claims and relies heavily
on claims-valuation software even when adjusting serious, non-routine
claims. This shift strongly supports the view-expressed forcefully in
Ian Ayres' Super Crunchers-that "intuition and experience are
evolving to interact with data-based decision making. "27
The insurance industry has long had massive amounts of data.
Since the 1990s, the industry has been working on making that data
accessible for (proprietary) analysis, for example by putting under
writing and claims data on the same platform, with the result that the
26. See generally

H. LAURENCE Ross, SETILED ouT oF CouRT: THE SociAL PRocEss OF

INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT

27.

(1980).

IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS Is THE NEW WAY TO BE

SMART

16-17 (2007).

I·,�� ....
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"truly massive" datasets that Ian Ayres describes are now available
within all of the major automobile insurance companies.28 Other lines
of insurance may have lagged behind,29 but the clear trend in the lia
bility insurance industry is to extend the quant revolution into other
lines and into more severe claims. This trend points toward the reali
zation of the "actuarial" approach to liability insurance that many
lawyers and law professors probably thought was already more fully
embodied in insurance practice than was actually the case.30
2.

The Increasingly Binding Nature of Liability Limits

Absent the poor claims-handling that leads to liability for "bad
faith," an insurance company's liability for any given claim is capped
at the dollar limit of the applicable insurance policy.31 No matter how
serious the injury or how wrongful the defendant's conduct, the liabil
ity insurance policy limit is the most that a liability insurance company
is contractually obligated to pay as long as the claim is handled prop
erly. Because plaintiffs almost never collect "real money" from Hreal
people," even a claim that involves damages that significantly exceed
the liability insurance policy limit will ordinarily be settled for no
more than the available insurance amount.32 Indeed, the more that
the value of the case exceeds the policy limit, the more quickly that
the case will be settled for that policy limit because of the well-estab
lished insurance law "duty to settle."33 This dynamic is well estab
lished and well appreciated by informed observers of the liability and
insurance universe.34
28. Author's personal knowledge based on use of confidential, proprietary insurance company

Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An
Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REv. 155 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kathryn Zeiler, Presentation to Law and Society Association:

data as reported in Albert Yoon & Tom Baker,

Medical Malpractice Reserving Practices (2009) (powerpoint slides on file with author) (report
ing surprising and persistent inaccuracies in medical malpractice insurance reserving revealed in
the Texas Insurance Department Closed Claim database).
30. Cf. Simon,

supra note

3, at 786 (describing the critique of actuarial practices in which the

individual is "the sum of the many roles he plays as a result of being a member of many status
groups").

The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 11 13 ( 1990).
Money, New Money, cmd the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35
LAw & Soc'y REv. 275, 276 (2001) .
33. Syverud, supra note 31, at 1116.
34. See generally Baker, supra note 32, at 275. See also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins &
Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (2006) (explaining this dy
31.

See generally

Kent D. Syverud,

32. Tom Baker, Bloocl

namic in the securities class action and directors' and officers' liability insurance contexts):

Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from
Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STuD. S9 (2007).

Kathryn Zeiler et al.,
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Less well appreciated, however, is the aggregate consequence when
liability insurance premiums fail to keep up with inflation. As Ken
neth Abraham explained in The Liability Century, the mandatory
minimum automobile insurance policy limits have significantly lagged
behind inflation, with the result that tort damages as determined by
the law on the books are increasingly likely to exceed the available
automobile insurance.35 Because the insurance companies' obligation
to pay is capped at the policy limit, and because "blood money" is so
rarely paid, this trend means that the damages awarded by tort law in
action increasingly are simply the liability limit of the defendants' au
tomobile liability insurance policy, sometimes supplemented by the
plaintiffs' underinsured motorist coverage. Research using the Texas
Department of Insurance medical malpractice claims database sug
gests that the same phenomenon may be occurring with respect to
medical malpractice claims, though with less impact on liability insur
ance overall because of the relatively small size of the medical liability
insurance market.36
3.

The Changing Nature of Liability Insurance Contracts

The two developments just discussed are most significant for auto
mobile liability insurance. This third development affects commercial
liability. Beginning with medical malpractice insurance in the 1970s,
the liability insurance industry has gradually been shifting its "long
tail" business (i.e., liability risks in which there is a long lag between
the wrongful conduct and the eventual lawsuit) into liability insurance
contracts that provide coverage on a claims-made basis.
Traditionally, liability insurance provided coverage on an accident
basis, meaning that the policy covered accidents that took place dur
ing the policy period.37 This is still the case for automobile liability
insurance. In the 1960s, the insurance industry shifted toward provid
ing coverage on an occurrence basis, which extended the original con
cept of accident to incorporate events that took place gradually,
potentially over a long period of time.38 This approach led to massive
exposures for asbestos and environmental injuries in the commercial
context, and also for birth- and childhood-related conditions in the
medical malpractice context.
35.

See

KENNETt! S. ABI{AIIAM, THE LIABILITY CENTlii{Y; INSURANCE AND ToRT LAW FROM

TilE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/1), at 10 1 (2008).

36.
37.
38.

See Zeiler ct at., supra note 34. at S9.
See ToM BAKER. INSliRANC:E LAw AND
See id.

Poucv 355 (2d ed. 2008).
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In response, the insurance industry shifted in the 1970s and 1980s to
providing coverage on a claims-made basis in professional liability in
surance and somewhat later-more gradually, and less completely-in
the product and environmental liability context.39 A claims-made pol
icy provides coverage for claims that are first made during the policy
period.40 The claims-made form of coverage provides greater predict
ability to insurers for two reasons. First, the policy is more likely to be
sold close in time to when the claim is paid, thereby allowing the in
surer to incorporate more recent information about the frequency and
severity of claims into the price for the coverage. Second, because a
claim can be first made only once, there is less likelihood that policies
from multiple years will be triggered by a claim or a set of related
claims (such as a mass tort), thereby capping the insurer's exposure at
the limit of a single policy (in marked contrast to the situation under
an occurrence policy).
B.

Transforming Risk into Uncertainty

At the same time that these developments transformed uncertainty
into risk, other developments pushed in the opposite direction. In the
personal lines liability insurance context, which mostly means automo
bile liability insurance, the two most important developments were
the "arms race" in risk segmentation and the politics of automobile
insurance pricing. The commercial lines context is more complicated
because commercial liability risks evolve with the underlying econ
omy. One important and easy-to-explain commercial lines develop
ment concerns corporations' increased willingness to retain risk, with
the result that commercial liability insurance increasingly involves the
right tail risk, precisely the opposite of personal automobile liability
insurance. The sections that follow explain each of these.
1.

The Arn1s Race in Automobile Risk Segmentation and
Distribution

Of all of the forms of insurance investigated by Ericson and Doyle,
personal automobile liability insurance is most like life insurance, at
least in terms of the dynamics of uncertainty and risk. Like mortality,
automobile liability risk is well understood in the aggregate. And, be
cause of the quant revolution in claims evaluation and the increasingly
binding nature of automobile liability insurance limits, the loss associ39. See id. at 388; Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Jn.wrcmc:e Policy Conditions in
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CoNN. INs.
L.J. 505, 508-09 (1998).
40. See generally Works, supra note 39, at 505.
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ated with any given automobile liability claim is almost as determina
ble as the loss associated with any given death claim. So, as with life
insurance, the competitive action lies in innovations in the slicing and
dicing of the insured population and in product distribution. (Unlike
life insurance, competition in the auto insurance industry rarely in
volves innovations in product development because of strict regula
tory controls over the automobile insurance policy.)41 A company
that develops a new way to identify the low risk-segment of an ex
isting risk category reaps a double benefit: lowering its own average
claims cost in that segment while increasing the average claims costs
of its competitors. Similarly, a company that develops a new way to
distribute its product-through a new affinity relationship or a new
direct mail or television campaign, for example-simultaneously gets
new customers and disrupts the business patterns of its competition.
The result is an evolving set of risk classifications that limits the
ability of insurers to price on the basis of their own claims history
(because they did not collect data on the basis of these classifications
in the past) and an evolving customer mix. As with life insurance, the
aggregate risk is a predictable, slowly moving mass, but the dynamics
of the market mean that individual insurers operate at the edge-or
just beyond the edge-of their knowledge. The quant revolution
changes the location of that edge, not the competitive pressure to op
erate just beyond it.
2.

The Politics of Automobile Insurance Pricing

The politics of automobile insurance pricing inserts an additional
uncertainty into the automobile liability market that does not exist in
the life insurance market. With the transition of the Massachusetts
automobile insurance market to a kind of managed competition,42
there are no longer any state insurance departments that set rates.
But all state insurance departments retain some authority over
changes in rates. Given inflation and the fact that insurance rates are
set in nominal dollar terms, all insurance companies eventually need
to raise their automobile insurance rates. In most cases, insurance
regulators do not object. But sometimes they do object. That is a
source of uncertainty.
41.

The recent "accident forgiveness" programs represent a partial exception to this rule.

Strictly speaking. accident forgiveness programs represent a change in pricing. not in product
design. but the programs are marketed as a feature that is analogous to a change in design.

42. See, e.g.. Phil Gusman. Mass. Auto Insurers Hail Improved Market Since Reforms, Despite
Criticism by AG. NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 19, 2010, at 14.
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Commercial Liability Insurance: A Window on the Underlying
Economy

It is difficult to make useful generalizations about a business that is
as diverse as commercial liability insurance, a field that in its broadest
definition includes professional liability insurance, many specialized
forms of liability insurance, and the more commonly understood gen
eral liability insurance. Liability insurance tends to extend over time
to match liability itself (with lags and with exceptions), and thus devel
opments in liability law, both on the books and in action, represent a
source of uncertainty for liability insurers.43 Almost all changes in the
economy produce at least some change in the mix of liabilities as
sumed by liability insurers, and thus the creative destruction of a capi
talist economy represents another source of uncertainty for liability
insurers.44 The shift from manufacturing to services, the globalization
of the supply chain, and the expansion of the high tech and health care
sectors of the economy, among many other developments, all have
consequences for liability insurers if only by reducing the predictive
value of historical information about the frequency and severity of
claims.
4.

Corporations Retain More Risk

There is one major cross-cutting development in the commercial
lines marketplace that is worth singling out: businesses of all kinds are
retaining greater levels of risk, as represented by the rising deductibles
and self-insured retentions. Businesses, unlike individuals, have
learned what may be the most important lesson of risk management
theory and research: because of the inevitable loading costs of insur
ance, it makes no sense to buy insurance for losses that are small in
relation to easily available assets.45 Since at least the 1980s, businesses
have preferred to buy liability insurance policies with higher deduct
ibles and higher limits.46 The aggregate result is to remove the most
predictable liabilities from the liability insurance pool, leaving insurers
dependent on providing protection against relatively extreme liabili
ties. Replacing the premium lost when a corporation raises its work
ers compensation or liability insurance deductible by $1 million
requires selling a lot of excess insurance, because excess coverage is
43. Baker,

supra note

25, at 133.

44. See generally JosEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
45.

See, e.g.,

Scorr E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RisK MANAGEMENT AND IN

SURANCE 489, 505 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining reasons for retaining risk).

46. /d. at 527 (reporting that "medium to large business insurance policies often include rela

tively large deductibles or self insured retentions").
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less expensive than primary insurance on a per-dollar-of-coverage ba
sis. As a result, commercial liability insurance has become increas
ingly focused on the right tail of the liability claim distribution, which
is characterized by larger, less frequent losses, especially for large or
ganizations. Liability insurers believe that, in the jargon of the busi
ness press, this is a "fat tail," meaning that commercial liability losses
do not follow a normal distribution.47 As the quant revolution en
ables large organizations to transform their liability uncertainties into
risk, the organizations will retain more of that risk, and they will en
deavor to shift the remaining uncertainties to their liability insurers.
C.

The Insurance Underwriting Cycle

As reflected most clearly in Figures 1 and 3, the property casualty
insurance industry goes through a business cycle that is characterized
by long periods of relatively stable insurance prices, often slowly de
clining in real terms, and short periods of rapid price increases. There
is an extensive literature on this cycle-including a contribution by
me-and perhaps the one thing upon which there is universal agree
ment is that no one fully understands what drives the cycle.4x Not
surprisingly, the cycle is a major preoccupation in the industry. Indus
try trade publications regularly report on what industry leaders and
analysts think about where the industry is in the cycle, and predictions
of this sort can have very significant strategic implications for
companies.49
During a "hard market," prices significantly exceed costs and insur
ers can implement new restrictions on coverage and underwriting.
During a "soft market," prices gradually decline in real terms and in
surers gradually abandon coverage and underwriting restrictions. By
the end of the soft market, almost all insurers are almost certainly
selling insurance below cost, retaining market share in the hope of
making money once the market turns hard. Warren Buffet, whose
most significant holdings are property casualty insurance companies,
Pricing Risk When Distributions Are Fat Tailed, 4 l A J. APPLIED
157, 157-58 ( 2004) (reporting that generally insurance claims arc fat tailed).
48. See Baker, supra note 22, a t 401-22 (summarizing literature). For recent contributions.
see Ursina B. Meier, Multi-National Underwriting Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance: Part/
Some Theory and Empirical Results, 7 J. OF RisK FIN. 64 (2006); Julien Trufin, Hansjorg Al
brecher & Michel Denuit, Impact of Umlenvriting Cycles on the Solvency of em lnwmm ce Com
pany, 13 N. AM. ACTUAR I AL J. 385 (2009).
49. See, e.g., David Gambrill, What Happened to the Hard Market?. CANADIAN UNDER·
WRITER, Oct. 2009, at 78, 78; Barrett Hubbard, The lnevital>ility of Market Cycles. CANADIAN
UNDERWRITER, Sept. 2007, at 34. 35; AI Slavin, Wlwt's Next?: Surplus Lines Writers Look to
New Products and Specialized Undenvriting to Extend Business, BEsT's REv. Apr. 2010, at 28,
47. See

Roger Gay,
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has famously advocated paying underwriters not to write insurance
during severe soft markets, because the company will almost certainly
lose money on the book of insurance sold at that time.5° The problem
is, of course, that no one really knows when the cycle reaches the
point at which liability insurance costs exceed prices-because the
costs will not be known for sure until the future-and no one really
knows the value of keeping market share during the soft market.51
The underwriting cycle contributes to the uncertainty in liability in
surance in a variety of ways. The periodic relaxation and restriction of
underwriting and coverage practices reduce the predictive value of
each insurance company's claims history, because the mix of risks in
sured does not remain consistent over time. Keeping market share
during a soft market involves heading off into the unknown. By defi
nition, the relaxation of underwriting and coverage restrictions means
selling insurance against risks that the insurer had not been willing to
insure in the prior period. Among reinsurers, a continuation of a soft
market means that the reinsurer needs to be easier for insurers to deal
with and that means relaxing-and at some point abandoning-de
tailed reporting requirements at the individual insured and claim
level.52 The result is that reinsurers do not have continuous individual
and claim level data of the sort that would allow them to control for
the changing mix of business among the insurance companies that
they reinsure. When the hard market arrives, insurance companies
raise prices and jettison some of their worst risks, almost certainly
writing profitable business-but just how profitable remains uncer
tain, as does the amount of time before enough new capital enters the
insurance market for the underwriting cycle to turn once again.53 In
that sense, we can regard the liability insurance underwriting cycle as
both a cause and a consequence of liability insurers' efforts to push
the insurability frontier.
50. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs. of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Share
holders 6-8 (Feb. 28, 2005),
51.

See

Matthew Dolan,

available at

http://www.berkshirehathaway.cornlletters/2004ltr.pdf.

Repeating tire Sins of Market Cycles,

INSKHITS, Oct. 2003, at 1 (on file

with author) (article by the president of a liability insurance company reporting "our industry
realizes the 'right priced' environment only momentarily during the shirt from the hard to the
soft market" and arguing "the cyclicality of this business will be perpetuated, and capacity will
engage in wild and irrational movements over the price/quality line. unless carriers" adopt a
variety of measures that are unlikely to be adopted given competitive pressures).
52. Author's confidential, personal communication with reinsurance underwriters as part of

the field research reported in ToM BAKER & SEAN J. GRJFFITII, ENsURJNO CoRPORATE Mis

coNDucT: How LtABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SIIAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010).
53.

See generally

note 12, at 255.

Baker,

supra

note 22, at 393: Dolan,

supra note

51, at 1: Fitzpatrick,

supra
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CoNCLUSION

These competitive consequences of the liability insurance under
writing cycle resonate well with the dynamic of Ericson and Doyle's
Uncertain Business.54 Even as liability insurers develop technologies
that would better predict the losses of a stable risk pool, competition
reshapes companies' risk pools, so that they operate just beyond the
edge of their knowledge. This dynamic helps explain how the liability
insurance field can feel out of control even to expert participants.
"Fear is the key," in the words of insurance industry leader Sean Fitz
patrick.55 Those feelings put expert passion behind the popular be
liefs that have fueled the restrictive tort reform movement. Taking the
long view, liability and liability insurance premiums have grown at
about the same rate as the U.S. economy. But few people live their
lives consistently taking this long view, and the long view may not
even be adaptive in the competitive arena.

54.
55.
Is

See generally ERICSON & DoYLE, supra note 1.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 255-56 (quoting title of

THE KEY).

Alistair MacLean's novel, FEAR

